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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CRYSTAL LIME AND CEMENT 
COMPANY, a corporation 
Paintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
GOLDEN W. ROBBINS and HAR-
RIET J. ROBBINS, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8948 
This action was originally tried to quiet title in favor 
of the appellant and plaintiff and against the respon-
dents and defendants in and to a tract of land situate 
on the foothills in the Northeast part of Salt Lake City. 
The partcular tract of land involved had originally been 
mining property and because of this, a question has 
arisen regarding the manner of assessment of the prop-
erty for general taxes. The Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah on September 16, 1949, handed down its De-
rision affirming the trial court's Judgment quieting title 
in the plaintiffs, but reversing that part of the decision 
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denying reimbursement of taxes. The Supreme Court's 
decision, in determining the manner in which the de-
fendants should be reimbursed for the payment of their 
taxes, stated: 
"We hold, therefore, that the plaintiff should 
be required to reimburse the defendants for the 
amount expended by them in purchasing their 
tax title to the 145 acres from the county, ex-
clusive of any premium the defendants might have 
paid, but only up to that amount which would 
have been due had the property been properly 
assessed by the Tax Commission during those 
years. Because it may be some tune before the 
State Tax Commission makes an assessment for 
those years it omitted to do so, if it ever makes 
an assessment at all, the lower court should 
fashion the relief granted to the parties to meet 
this exigency. It would work an injustice on the 
plaintiff to delay entering a decree quieting title 
in it until the Tax Commission acts. The lower 
court, could for instance, require the plaintiff to 
reimburse the defendants for the mnount paid 
by them and if there were any likelihood that the 
assessment for those back years, if and when 
made by the Tax Cmnmission, would be substan-
tially less than that 1nade by the county assessor, 
exact fron1 defendants assurance that the defen-
dants would repay to the plaintiff the difference." 
Thereafter, on June 5, 1950, the appellant filed a 
Notice of Application for Judg1nent in Accordance with 
Mandate of the Supren1e Court in order to cmnply with 
the Supre1ne Court Decision concerning the reimburse-
rnent of the defendants for taxes covering the property 
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(R. 9). Thereafter, on June 8, 1950, the Respondents 
obtained a continuance of the hearing to Saturday, J nne 
17, 1950 (R. 10). 
On J nne 19, 1950, the Court heard the Motion of 
the Appellant at which it atte1npted to introduce evi-
dence to establish the value which the State Tax Con1-
Inisson might put on the property (R. 13). The ev]dence 
was rejected and argument was 1nade by each party, 
attempting to establish the proper amount to be reim-
bursed to the respondents. The appellant offered in court 
to reimburse the respondents in the amount of $235.7 4, 
the amount Respondents claimed had been paid for the 
property (R. 13). After considerable argument, the court 
recessed. No written Findings or Judgment were entered 
in the case, but a Minute Entry was shown to have been 
entered on June 19, as follows: 
"The Court finds the issues in favor of the deft. 
and against the pltf. and the matter is dismissed/' 
Thereafter, the appellant against attempted to take 
some steps to obtain relief and filing a Notice of Motion 
to Dis1niss Action on August 8, 1953. After argument and 
the apparent introduction of evidence, the Court again 
made nothing more than a Minute Entry, wherein it 
denied the appellant's Motion to Dismiss (R. 22). 
Again on 11ay 22, 1958, the appellant attempted to 
obtain relief by filing a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Prosecution and Motion for Decree Quieting Title Pur-
suant to Opinion of Supreme Court. After argument, 
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said Motion was denied by a Minute Entry and no written 
Findings or Judgment were entered (R. 24, 25). 
Thereafter, on July 21, 1958, the respondent filed 
a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice (R. 26), and on July 
:25, 1958, appellant filed a Motion to Enter Order in 
Accordance with Mandate or for Entry of Written 
Judgment (R. 28, 29). Appellant also filed Plaintiff's 
Answer to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice 
( R. 30). Respondent on July 28, 1958, filed a X otice of 
Hearing and Appellant on July :29, 1958, likewise filed a 
Notice of Hearing. After the matter was fully argued, 
the court entered its Order and Judgment of Dismissal 
with Prejudice (R. 42), and from that Order and Judg-
ment, the appellant takes this appeal. 
STATE~IEXT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MO-
TION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDI·CE AND IN ADJUDGING 
THAT PLAINTIFF'S ACTION AND COMPLAINT BE DIS-
MISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
(a) THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
ISSUES OF THE CASE HAVE BEEN DENIED 
UPON THE MERITS BY THE COURT IN FAVOR 
OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
(b) THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
CASE HAS NOT BEEN PROSECUTED WITH DILI-
GENCE AND HAS THUS RESULTED IN PREJU-
DI·CE TO THE DEFENDANTS 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION THAT THE COURT HEAR EVIDENCE AND AR-
GUMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DIRECTION OF 
THE SUPREME COURT AND ENTER ITS WRITTEN 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DE-
CREE IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH, DETERMINING 
THE REMAINING ISSUES AND THE AMOUNT DUE TO 
DEFENDANTS. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HEAR AR-
GUMENTS AND TO ENTER ITS WRITTEN FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DE.CREE IN CON-
FORMITY WITH THE WRITTEN MINUTE ENTRY HERE-
TOFORE ENTERED BY JUDGE CLARENCE E. BAKER ON 
JUNE 19, 1950. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION THAT THE COURT ENTER WRIT-
TEN FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
DE.CREE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MINUTE ENTRY 
OF JUDGE STEW ART M. HANSEN HERETOFORE 
ENTERED ON JUNE 2, 1958. 
POINT V. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENTER AN 
ORDER OR JUDGMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MO-
TION TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDI·CE AND IN ADJUDGING 
THAT PLAINTIFF'S ACTION AND COMPLAINT BE DIS-
MISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 
The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss with Pre-
judice and therein listed five ( 5) grounds for said Motion, 
which are shown at Page 26 of the Record. These five 
grounds can be combined into two grounds and summed 
up as follows: (a) That the issues of the case have here-
tofore been denied upon the merits by the court in favor 
of the defendants; and, (b) that the plaintiff, in failing 
to comply with the order of the court, has also fa~led 
to prosecute the case with diligence, resulting in prejudice 
to the said defendants. 
(a) THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
ISSUES OF THE CASE HAVE BEEN DENIED 
UPON THE MERITS BY THE COURT IN FAVOR 
OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
The only issues decided by the Court in this case were 
those tried in the Lower Court and affirmed by the 
opinion of the Supreme Court (R. 2-7). Subsequent to 
the entry of this Suprmne Court decision, there has been 
no adjudication of the rights of the parties nor has there 
been any decision by the Court on the 1nerits in favor 
of either party. The Respondent, in 1naking such an ar-
gument, 1nust be referring to the :Minute Entry. dated 
June 19, 1950, as a final judgment. 
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This Minute Entry resulted from the Appellant's 
attempt to comply with the mandate of the Supreme 
Court decision. Appellant filed a Motion entitled "Notice 
of Application for Judgment in Accordance with Mandate 
of the Supreme Court". This Motion was called on for 
hearing before Judge Baker on said date. At this hearing, 
the plaintiff's (Appellant's) attorney attempted to intro-
duce evidence showing the assessed valuation of the 
property under an assessment made by the Utah State 
Tax Commission. This evidence was not admitted by the 
Court and so in a further attempt to obtain relief under 
the Supreme Court Decision, the Appellant offered to 
reimburse the Respondents for the amount paid for the 
Tax Deed, to-wit, $236.00 (R. 17). This offer was based 
upon the Appellant's interpretation of the Supreme Court 
Decision, the applicable paragraph of which is cited 
above. The offer was refused by the Respondents and 
further argument in the hearing ensued (R. 17-19). The 
Court recessed and there appeared in the Docket Book 
the following Minute Entry: 
"Entered Order: The Ct. finds the issues in favor 
of the Deft. and against the Pltf. and the matter 
is dismissed." 
This Minute Entry ended the proceedings so far as said 
hearing was concerned and no formal Judgment or 
Findings were ever entered. 
Thus the Respondent, in his Motion, which also must 
be taken to be the grounds for denial of Appellant's 
Motion, can not correctly argue that the Trial Court 
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1nade any determination of the matters on their merits. 
There simply was no Judgment entered. 
vVithout a final Judgment duly entered in the case, 
there is no final decision of the Court and the matter is 
still pending awaiting a determination of the amounts 
to be reimbursed. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that a :Minute Entry such as we have in this case, is not 
a final Judgment. Until such a final Judgment is entered, 
the Trial Court has made no final decision of the matters 
before it. 
In the case of Robison vs. Fillmore Commercial & 
Savings Bank, 61 Utah 398, 213 Pac. 790, the Supreme 
Court, in dismissing the appeal, stated: 
"it appears from the Minute Orders of the lower 
court that ..... counsel for plaintiff in open court 
states that the plaintiff stands on its Complaint 
as filed herein. The court then enters its Order 
dismissing said Complaint. The Xotice of Appeal 
is taken from the Judgment dismissing plaintiff's 
Complaint. No Judgment further than these :Jlin-
ute Entries is shown to have been 1nade or entered 
by the court. Upon authority of the opinion of 
this court in Lukisch v. lTtah Construction Co., 
46 Utah 317, 150 Pac. 298, these :Jiinute En trieR 
do not constitute an~- Judg1nent of the court dis-
missing the plaintiff's cause of action . .:\n appeal 
is allowed only fr01n final judg1nent. .... '' 
Again our Court stated in Omega Inrestment C01n-
pany vs. 1Voo1ey, 75 lTtah ~74, ~S-! Pac. 523, that: 
"There nm8t be a final judg1nent entered. A 
judg1nent is a final deter1nination of the rights 
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of the parties. Lukisch vs. Utah Construction 
Company, 46 Utah, 317, 150 Pac. 298 ..... In 
connection with this point, it is to be noted that 
the present transcript does not contain any 'copy 
of judgment' ..... in the Judgment Roll which 
purports to have been made upon the order of 
the court of January 5, 1929 ..... This court has 
previously held that there must appear from the 
record that there was a judgment entered upon 
the order evidenced in the minute entry. The min-
ute entry is not sufficient (citing cases)." 
For other cases, please see Stubbs v. Third Judicial 
Di·strict, 106 Utah 539, 150 P. 2d 783, and Williams 'V. 
Tuckett, 98 Utah 398, 95 P. 2d 982. 
Thus it cannot be maintained that the Trial Court 
has at any time subsequent to the entry of the Supreme 
Court Decision, made any determination of the rights of 
the parties which is a final adjudication thereof. It is 
this very deficiency which the plaintiff has attempted 
to remedy by filing its Motion for Entry of Written 
Judgment (R. 28). The Lower Court, however, in now 
upholding Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, has actually 
determined that the prior Minute Entry of the Lower 
Court constitutes a final judgment on the merits. This, 
of course, cannot be the case either as a matter of fact 
or under the law cited above. There has not been a final 
adjudication of the parties' rights. 
Since there is no final decision, Appellants should 
be allowed to have the matters reviewed either by hearing 
pursuant to the mandate of the Court or by an appeal 
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from the judgment of the Trial Court handed down in 
carrying out this mandate. By its present dismissal, the 
Court has prevented the plaintiff from having either 
procedure. Let us discuss first the hearing required by 
the mandate. 
The Supreme Court, in its decision, affirmed the 
Lower Court judgment quieting title in the plaintiff and 
then went on to order the Trial Court to determine the 
amount of taxes to be reimbursed to the defendant. This 
Court said: 
"We hold, therefore, that the plaintiff should 
be required to reimburse the defendants for the 
amount expended by them in purchasing their 
tax title ..... Because it may be some time before 
the State Tax Commission makes an assessment 
for those years it ommitted to do so, if it ever 
makes an assessment at all, the lower court should 
fashion the relief granted to the parties to meet 
this exigency ..... " 
The Trial Court was thus ordered to determine the 
amount due and in refusing to make this determination, 
has deprived the plaintiff of the right to have the taxes 
determined and to have the proceeding terminated. 
Appellant attmnpted to comply with the 1nandate 
by calling on for hearing its Notice of Application for 
Judgment in Accordance with Mandate of the Supreme 
Court. Evidence and argunwnt submitted by the Ap-
pellant gave it no relief and the 1natter was dismissed. 
Thereafter, in 1953, Appellant again attempted unsuc-
cessfully to obtain relief by asking for a disnrissal of the 
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proceeding in order to obtain relief by a new action. This 
was necessary inasmuch as the Court, under Judge Baker, 
had already ruled against Plaintiff, thus precluding the 
seeking of further relief of the same nature before an-
other Judge. 
The Court in both cases, has prevented the plaintiff 
from obtaining the relief ordered by the Supreme Court 
Decision and in so doing, has not complied with the 
Supreme Court Decision. It is well accepted that the 
Trial Court must comply with the mandate of the 
Suprerne Court. Leach 'V. Manhart, 113 P. 2d 1002; 
DaRouch v. District Court of Third Jttdicial District, 70 
P. :2d 1006, 95 Utah 227, 116 A.L.R. 1147. 
A further question arises as to the effect of the 
rrrial Court's dismissal with prejudice, from which this 
appeal is taken. This judgment seeks to operate retro-
actively by dismissing not only the proceedings relating 
to the determination of the tax, but also the complete 
cause of action (R. 42). This order thus reverses the 
Supreme Court's affirmance of the judgment quieting 
title in the plaintiff and results in the divesture of plain-
tiff's land. It is well established that the Lower Court 
cannot, unless so directed by the Supreme Court decision, 
reverse the original Trial Court's decision, nor reverse 
the affirmance of said decision by the Supreme Court. 
The Court, in dismissing the Complaint, has gone 
beyond any power it may have to dismiss this action. 
The Lower Court now must be confined to the issues 
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re1nanded to it by the Supreme Court decision and those 
Issues only involve the determination of the amount of 
taxes. 
The Trial Court, upon remand, only has jurisdiction 
over the particular matters directed to its attention by 
the Supreme Court Decision. As is stated in Street 1~·· 
Fottrth Judicial Dvstrct Court, 191 P. 2d 153, 113 rtah 
60: 
"The principles boil down to this fundamental 
propostion as to all matters adjudicated by the 
Appellate Court, both the Trial Court and the 
parties are foreclosed from further trying those 
matters. They become the law of the case. But 
as to matters left open by the Appellate Court, 
it is within the sound discretion of the Trial Court 
to permit amended or supplemental pleadings as 
to those matters." 
Again, as is stated in Glenn rs. Chambers, 56 X.",Y. 
2d 892, where the Court quotes and follows Ronna rs. 
American State Bank, 246 N.,V. 798 (Iowa): 
"When the opinion of tllis Court indicates that 
the cause is reversed and re1nanded for a special 
purpose, the District Court upon the remand is 
limited to do the special thing authorized by this 
Court in its opinion, and nothing else.'' 
The Court also cites 3 An1. J ur. 730, Appeal and Error. 
Sec. 12:~-t: and 5 (b) C.J.S., Sec. 1960 et seq. 
A case very nearly in point to the present one is 
Thomas vs. Durschla!J, 102 N.E. 2d 11-t Here the plain-
tiff sued to quiet title by re1noving a tax deed cloud on 
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the title held by defendant. The Trial Court decided in 
plaintiff's favor, but failed to reimburse the defendant 
for taxes paid. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court affir1ned 
the Lower Court's decision relating to the title question, 
but reversed the Lower Court's decision relating to the 
rei1nbursement of the taxes and remanded the case. The 
Court said: 
"Clearly the Findings of Fact made by the 
Chancellor are true and not against the manifest 
weight of the evidence. In all respects the Decree 
is confirmed, except for the erroneous failure of 
the Chancellor to decree reimbursement of Durch-
slag, by Thomas, for all the taxes, interest and 
costs properly paid out by the former, and except 
for the erroneous assessment of the costs against 
Durchslag. As to these matters, the Decree of the 
Superior Court of Cook County is reversed and 
remanded with the direction to enter a Decree 
which conforms with this opinion." 
The mandate of the Court stated: 
"Therefore, it is considered that * * * this 
cause be remanded * * * * * with direction to enter 
a Decree which conforms with the opinion attached 
to this mandate." 
Upon remand, plaintiff atte1npted to contest the 
defendant's right to reimbursement, but the Trial Court 
proceeded to hear evidence upon the assumption that 
nothing remained to be done except as was relative to 
the taxes paid. The Supreme Court, in affirming the 
Trial Court's strict adherance to the mandate, stated: 
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"Where a judgment is reversed by an Appellate 
Court, the judgment of that court is final upon 
all questions decided and those questions are no 
longer open to consideration. The Court to which 
a cause is remanded can take only such proceed-
ings as conform to the judgment of the Appellate 
Tribunal * * * * * where as here the directions 
of a reviewing court are specific, a positive duty 
devolves upon the Court to which the cause is 
remanded to enter an Order or Decree in accord-
ance with the directions quoted in the mandate. 
*** The order of this Court upon the prior appeal 
is not ambiguous. The cause was remanded for but 
a single purpose and specific directions were 
given. The Chancellor, upon remand of the cause~ 
lacked discretion concerning the granting of re-
lief to defendant in the respects described 1n 
(the prior decision)." 
Also see Flanigan t·s. McFeely, 120 At. 2d 102. 
Therefore, it would seem that although the Order 
of Dismissal refers to a complete dis1nissal of the action, 
it can and should only actually affect the proceedings 
relating to the determination of the a1nount of taxes due 
the defendant. All other questions have been decided and 
are not open to this Court's detennination. 
With reference to the appeal to which Appellant 
should be entitled, it is readily apparent that such an 
appeal has been denied by this judgment of the Lower 
Court. When the Lower Court denied the plaintiff and 
the defendant the right to a detern1ination of the taxe~ 
to be reiinbursed, neither part~· took any steps to 1nake tlw 
order of the Court a final appealable order. although 
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both had this opportunity. Inasmuch as Judge Baker~s 
Order of Dismissal was in favor of the defendant, it 
would seem that said defendant should have been the 
proper party to make the final appealable order. Defen-
dant did not take this step. Neither did defendant have 
entered a final appealable order after the dismissal by 
Judge Jeppson, occurring in 1953. 
The plaintiff attempted to obtain an appealable order 
by its :\lotion filed July 25, 1958. However, this Motion 
was denied by the Lower Court's last judgment and 
left only as an appealable Inatter the propriety of the 
denial of the Motion. Thus plaintiff has been effectively 
prevented frmn either a. proper hearing pursuant to the 
mandate of the Court, or an appeal from a judgment 
relating to this hearing on the mandate. 
(b) THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
CASE HAS NOT BEEN PROSECUTED WITH DILI-
GENCE AND HAS THUS RESULTED IN PREJU-
DICE TO THE DEFENDANTS 
It is recognized, of course, that a dismissal for want 
of prosecution will not be disturbed on appeal in the 
absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Cameron vs. 
Cameron, 252 P. 2d 408. However, in this case, in view 
of the record before the Court, Appellant maintains 
that there has been a clear abuse of discretion and also 
that the situation here involved is not a proper one in-
volving want of prosecution. 
A list of the steps taken by the plaintiff, commencing 
with the first Motion in 1950 and continuing through 
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the Motion to Dismiss in 1953 and the subsequent Motions 
in 1958, do not indicate a lack of prosecution, particularly 
when considered in the light of the legal problems in-
volved under the Supreme Court decision. The Respon-
dents took no steps to determine the tax payable to then1. 
The Respondents, on the other hand, have only interposed 
one pleading and one action on its own accord since 
the entry of the Supren1e Court decision, that being the 
~Lotion to Dismiss filed after Appellant had again at-
tempted some action. The Respondents, notwithstanding 
their equal obligation to move ahead either in the prep-
aration of the Findings and a final appealable judgment 
or in the seeking of relief to determine the amount of 
the reimbursable taxes, sat quietly by until Appellant 
renewed its activity in the case. Only after the hearing 
June 2, 1958, upon plaintiff's ~lotion (R. 2-!) did de-
fendants take any action whatsoever. Respondents make 
no clain1 that they have been prejudiced and can make 
no such claim, notwithstanding son1e very strong langu-
age to the contrary c01npletely without foundation in their 
Affidavit (R. 32, 34). Appellant has always attempted 
to have the correct amount detennined and up to and 
including the present tilne, and want the Court to deter-
mine the correct mnount, and not to 1nerely dis1niss the 
action. 
Notwithstanding this record, the Court now holds 
that Appellant should have all of the property taken fr01n 
it because it has done nothing to bring this law suit to 
a final conclusion. This does not appear to be consistent 
with the rreord and thus is an abuse of disrretion. 
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Inasmuch as the only determination to be made by 
the Trial Court involves the amount of money to be paid 
the Respondents, it is only reasonable to assume that the 
Respondents should have some interest in determining the 
amount of taxes to be paid them. It is unrealistic to 
argue that the Appellant had the only burden of 1noving 
ahead. 
As stated in Wright vs. Howe, 150 P. 956, 46 Utah 
588: 
"The defendants had the smne right to press the 
action to trial that the plaintiff had, and if they 
were willing to permit it to remain untried, and 
especially in the absence of any showing of pre-
judice, they can not complain." 
The mere lapse of time is not sufficient upon which to 
justify a dismissal of the action for lack of prosecution. 
In the case of Kuyich v. Lillie, 260 P. 2d 383 (Montana), 
the Court, in denying dismissal for lack of prosecution, 
stated: 
"~Iere lapse of time is not sufficient in itself to 
justify dismissal of the actions, State Saving 
Bank v. Albertson, 102 P. 692 (Montana) and El-
dredge v. Idaho State Penitentiary, 30 P. 2d 781. 
Defendant was privileged to notice his demurreri3 
for hearing, but this he did not do, notwith-
standing that he had the same right to place the 
actions for trial as had the plaintiffs." 
The Court also cites Wright v. Howe, supra. 
In the case of Lyon vs. State, 283 P. 2d 1105 (Ida.) 
an action was con1menced January 5, 1942 to quiet title 
to real property. It was stricken from the calendar until 
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October 2, 1953, when the defendant moved to reinstate 
the cause and then moved to dismiss for lack of prose-
cution. The Supreme Court, in reversing the Trial Court's 
dismissal, stated: 
"Was the cause properly dismissed for lack of 
prosecution~ It should be noted that Respondents 
made the motion to have the cause revived and 
placed on the calendar. Shortly thereafter, the 
demurrer was argued and ruling made. There 
was nothing asserted that would indicate that 
Respondents had lost any rights or had been pre-
judiced in any manner hy the delay. The fact that 
the prosecution of the action was delayed for a 
considerable length of time would not in itself and 
standing alone be conclusive of the matter and 
Respondents would not be entitled to a sumn1ary 
dismissal, over objection, where no prejudice ·was 
asserted or shown or other sufficient reasons for 
dismissal made to appear. There was nothing pre-
sented before the trial court that would indicate 
that appellants had unreservedly abandoned the 
action." 
Again, in the case of Nielson vs. Old Charles Dickens 
Minivng Company, 1 P. 2d 193 (Ida.). an action was 
commenced March 17, 1924, and a l\Iotion to Dismiss was 
filed in 1930, after various negotiations and dealings 
were had and defendant had 1nade no objection to the 
delay. In reversing the Lower Court's dismissal, the 
Supreme Court stated: 
"It will be noticed that the defendants, other 
than Winigar, made no objection on the ground 
of delay until the present attorneys for Appellant 
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began to vigorously take steps for the disposition 
of the issues in the case. 
"Certainly it does not appear from the record 
herein that Appellant abandoned or at any time 
int~nded to abandon his action to enforce pay-
ment * * * * * and in view of the negotiations 
and dealings transpiring, it would seem arbitrary 
to dismiss the action." 
An examination of the decision of our Supreme Court 
indicates that a substantial period of time was contem-
plated before the matter might be finally decided. The 
Court recognized that several years 1night pass before 
the final tax liability could be determined. The Court 
stated: 
"Because it may be some time before the State 
Tax Commission makes an assessment for those 
years it ommitted to do so, if it ever makes an 
assessment at all, the lower court should fashion 
the relief granted to the parties to meet this 
exigency. It would work an injustice on the plain-
tiff to delay entering a decree quieting title in it 
until the Tax Commission acts." 
Certainly from this language, it is apparent that 
the Trial Court could adequately protect both parties' 
interests over the years until the tax assessment problem 
is settled. In view of this 1nandate it is difficult to see 
how Respondent would in any way be prejudiced by a 
determination by the Trial Court of the tax responsibility, 
either at an earlier date or now. It is also apparent that 
the Supreme Court anticipated a possible delay in final 
disposition of the case. These factors further rule out 
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any argument that the Supreme Court was concerned 
with an immediate action in order to protect the parties' 
interests. 
It should also be noted that this is not a case where 
nothing was done pursuant to the mandate of the Su-
preme Court. Rather, the record indicates that six months 
after the entry of the Supreme Court decision on Sep-
tember 16, 1949, the plaintiff called the matter on for 
hearing in compliance with said mandate. Any delay, 
therefore, has not been a delay of the Appellant, but 
rather a delay of the Respondents in not having entered 
the final appealable order after that hearing. The order 
was in favor of the Respondents and, therefore, it wa8 
encu1nbent upon the Respondents to do what was neces-
sary to bring the matter to a final judgment. The Re-
spondents failed to do this and their failure cannot be 
associated with the Appellant and used as a reason for 
dis1nissing the action because of the failure to prosecute 
said action. 
The longest period of inactivity in this case was 
frmn 1953 when the l\iotion to Dis1niss was filed by the 
Appellant, to l\Iay, 1958, when plaintiff filed a l\Iotion 
to Dis1niss for Lack of Prosecution, and for Decree 
Quieting Title or a period of about five years. Only six 
1nonths elapsed frmn the entry of the decision to the 
filing of plantiff's l\Iotion in 1950. Three years elapsed 
from that time to 1953 when plaintiff's l\Iotion to Dis-
miss was filed and five years elapsed frmn that date to 
the present date. During all of these years, the defendants 
took no affirnmtin~ action and left everything up to the 
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plaintiff. The mere lapse of time is not sufficient grounds 
for dismissal for lack of prosecution. Wright v. Howe, 
supra. 
Therefore, it would seem that the Respondents are 
the parties who have failed to prosecute this action in any 
\vay whatsoever. Can said Respondents now co1ne in and 
clai1n that the Appellant has done nothing when as a 
1natter of fact the Appellant on four different occasions 
has attempted to obtain relief, but has been denied in its 
efforts. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION THAT THE COURT HEAR EVIDENCE AND AR-
GUMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DIRECTION OF 
THE SUPREME COURT AND ENTER ITS WRITTEN 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DE-
CREE IN ACCORDANCE THEREWITH, DETERMINING 
THE REMAINING ISSUES AND THE AMOUNT DUE TO 
DEFENDANTS. 
As has been fully discussed under Point I, Appellant 
1s entitled to a hearing on the n1erits pursuant to the 
Supreme Court Decision. 
In addition thereto, Appellant is entitled to Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment based upon 
the facts adduced at the hearing before Judge Baker 
June 19, 1950. 
Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides 
in part as follows: 
"In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with an advisory jury, the Court shall, 
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unless the same are waived, find the facts specially 
and state separately its Conclusions of Law there-
on and direct the entry of the appropriate Judg-
ment * * * * *" 
Since Judge Baker is no longer District Judge and 
cannot make the Findings and Conclusions, a new court 
should hear the matter and enter the Findings, Con-
clusions and Judgment. This procedure has been denied 
Appellant, resulting in a deviation from the above rule. 
The same issues unsuccessfully placed before the Court 
in 1950 could now be tried, and the fact that the property 
n1ay have increased in value, as is claimed by Respon-
dents, would have no effect other than a possible benefit 
to the Respondents because of higher taxes and more 
interest thereon. 
Thus as a practical solution to the problem, as well 
as one supported by the la,v·, Appellants are entitled 
to a hearing to determine the extent of reimbursement 
of taxes under the Supreme Court Decision. 
POINT III. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO HEAR AR-
GUMENTS AND TO ENTER ITS WRITTEN FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DEoCREE IN CON-
FORMITY WITH THE WRITTEN MINUTE ENTRY HERE-
TOFORE ENTERED BY JUDGE CLARENCE E. BAKER ON 
JUNE 19, 1950. 
POINT IV. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION THAT THE COURT ENTER WRIT-
TEN FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LA\r AND 
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DEoCREE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MINUTE ENTRY 
OF JUDGE STEW ART M. HANSEN HERETOFORE 
ENTERED ON JUNE 2, 1958. 
These points should be considered together and in 
relation to Point II. As has been argued before, the Ap-
pellant is entitled to written Findings, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment from which an appeal can be taken. 
Until such documents are signed and entered by the 
Court, there is nothing from which Appellant can proper-
ly determine the basis for the Court's decision. 
Appellant is entitled to Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Judgment, otherwise cmnpliance with 
the Rule and with the Supreme Court Decision is cir-
cumvented. Wasatch OiJl Refining Company vs. Wade, 
92 Utah 50, 63 P. 2d 1070, Baird vs. Upper Canal Irri-
gation Company, 70 Utah 57, 257 P. 1060. 
POINT V. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ENTER AN 
ORDER OR JUDGMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
MANDATE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH. 
This point is fully discussed u:qder Point I above. 
The Lower Court being direct~d to proceed pursuant to 
the mandate of the Supreme Court, must upon applica-
tion of Appellant afford the proper relief set forth by 
the Supreme Court, or upon failing to do so, enter an 
Order from which an appeal will lie. This procedure has 
not been observed in this case and by reason thereof, 
Appellant has been denied an appeal on the merits of 
the issues existing between the parties. 
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SUMMARY 
Appellant obtained a Judgment which was in effect 
affirmed, quieting title in it and against Respondents 
to certan real property situate in Salt Lake County. Ap-
pellant, after the entry of the Supreme Court Decision, 
has in a variety of ways, attempted to wind up the 
matter according to said Decision. Respondents, on the 
other hand, although apparently vitally interested in the 
amount of reimbursement to which Respondents are 
entitled, have done nothing to show their interest until 
after the Appellants' final attempt to conclude the Inatter 
in June, 1958. Certainly Appellant's actions, although 
extending over several years, have indicated no abandon-
ment of its position in the proceedings. There has merely 
been a lapse of time between each of the actions atten1pterl 
by Appellant. On the other hand, Respondents' failure to 
act during an~· of the periods between ~lppellant's acts, 
indicate a waiver of any dissatisfaction concerning the 
slowness of the proceeding. Were the Respondents really 
concerned about this n1atter, they might have Inoved to 
disn1iss between 1953 and 1958. However, they waited 
until after the hearing in June, 1958, called on by the 
Appellant, to pursue any nf otion to Dis1niss. Tllis action 
of the Respondents should not be considered as any 
indication that Respondents were dissatisfied with the 
progress of the proceedings. This inaction of Respond-
ents indicates an abandon1nent by the1n of any bona fide 
claim of failure to prosecute the proceedings. 
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The result of the ruling of this Lower Court is now 
to divest the Appellant of the real property, contrary 
to the Decision of the Trial Court hereinbefore entered 
and contrary to the direction of the Supreme Court in 
its decision. This inequity is forced on Appellant not-
·withstanding its bona fide efforts to bring the matter to 
a close. 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellant submits 
that the action of the Trial Court in dismissing this 
action and the Complaint herein is contrary to the law 
and is further contrary to principles of equity. Said 
decision should be reversed and the matter should be 
remanded for trial upon the issues set forth in the Su-
preme Court Decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
BY 
Elliott Lee Pratt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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